China's Neighbourhood Play

In the midst of all the turmoil unleashed by Trump's tariffs -- and the gloves truly coming off between Washington and Beijing -- many readers of this newsletter may have missed an important development from Beijing yesterday (April 9) -- a key meeting on China's neighbourhood policy convened by the top leadership, the first since 2013.

Here's a short post directing readers to a few interesting readings about the meet -- which called "for deepening development integration by establishing high-level connectivity networks and strengthening industrial and supply chain cooperation" -- and why it's worth paying attention to.

Background: A year into his first term, in October 2013, Xi Jinping convened the "Conference on the Diplomatic Work with Neighbouring Countries" . Here is what he said then.

A Xinhua report of this year’s conference published yesterday in English noted:

China’s relations with neighbouring countries are… entering a critical phase where regional dynamics and global transformations are deeply intertwined, the conference noted, calling for taking into account both the domestic and international situations and coordinating the two major priorities of development and security.

Liu Yang of the Beijing Channel has a comprehensive overview today of this week's conference and its takeaways:

The conference pointed out that China is vast with long borders, and its surrounding areas are an important foundation for development and prosperity, a key to safeguarding national security, the foremost priority for managing foreign affairs, and a focal point in promoting the construction of a community of shared future for mankind. Conducting work related to neighbouring countries should be viewed from a global perspective, enhancing the sense of responsibility and mission for such work…

It called for deepening development integration by establishing high-level connectivity networks and strengthening industrial and supply chain cooperation.

You can read his full post here.

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Readers may also find of interest two pieces The Hindu recently carried on the current state of India-China relations offering two different perspectives. In today’s paper, former NSA MK Narayanan offers a cautious take on the current on-going attempt at normalisation between the two countries.

The Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi, Xu Feihong, in this piece, outlined three steps for Beijing and New Delhi to take to “forge a right path” and said there was “a strong motivation for exchanges and cooperation”:

The two sides maintain communication on issues of mutual concern, such as the resumption of direct flights, visa facilitation, pilgrimage to Mount Gang Renpoche and Lake Mapam Yun Tso (Kailash Manasarovar Yatra) in Xizang, and also resident journalists, striving to achieve results as soon as possible. Bilateral economic and trade cooperation has maintained good momentum. In the first two months of this year, the bilateral trade volume reached $23.6 billion…. In the first quarter of this year, the Chinese Embassy and Consulate-Generals in India have issued over 70,000 visas to Indian citizens, with a year-on-year increase of approximately 15%.

Finally, speaking at a media conclave yesterday, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar said both sides were “moving in a positive direction”, a report in the Hindustan Times said, adding that the on-going process of normalisation was “very arduous and painstaking”. He offered a more detailed take on ties in a March 26 conversation with Asia Society President D. Kyung-wha Khang:

From 1988, there was a certain understanding between India and China on the basis of which the relationship was rebuilt. We obviously couldn't solve the problems, most of all the boundary issue, but we built a relationship, we managed it, there were dialogues and negotiations going on while other parts of the relationship grew…

The economic relationship grew…there were more exchanges, people went up… And even on the boundary, in fact, we had a series of agreements which laid out in great detail protocols on how to manage the boundary, how to deploy, how to ensure that something accidental doesn't happen. All the while, you know, negotiations were going on to find a solution to the boundary issue.

Now, from then, let us, if we use 1988 as a starting point, till 2020, while we had had incidents along in the boundary, in the border areas, we had not actually had bloodshed. The last bloodshed was 45 years before 2020.

So, what happened in 2020 was actually very traumatic for the relationship. It wasn't just the bloodshed, it was the disregard of written agreements, because this isn't a grey area we are talking about. I mean, the departure from the terms of what was agreed to was very sharp and very substantial.

Now, through this period, I mean, obviously it took us … I mean, we're still dealing with some parts of this, so it's not like the issue has completely gone away. We felt that, I mean, obviously it called for a military response on India's side, which happened. There was a counter-deployment by us. But we also felt that the way forward was to find a negotiated outcome, and that's what we've been trying to do since 2020.

Now, the answer to your question is, we don't think this period serves the interests of either India or China. You know, how do we benefit by having a very tense relationship with that large number of troops out there in a very hostile environment, and all the collateral damage which it has done to the relationship? Because obviously, if peace and tranquility in the border areas were disturbed, then, you know, the rest of the relationship can't go on as normal.

So, I would say, principles or concepts, we have basically made two points, which is differences should not become disputes, and that competition should not become conflict. That we can differ on many issues. We do compete on many issues, but because we compete doesn't mean that there should be a conflict between us. We are very realistic about it… So, we know that between India and China, there will, at least in the foreseeable future, there will be issues. But there are ways of addressing those issues. And what happened in 2020 was not the way to address those issues.

So right now, we feel that from October of last year, the relationship has seen some improvement. We are working on different aspects of it. I've met my counterpart a few times, so have my other senior colleagues.

And what we are trying, step by step, is to see if we can rebuild, undo some of the damage which happened as a result of their actions in 2020, and we can rebuild the relationship. And we genuinely, sincerely think that this is in our mutual interest, that if one looks at that 2020 to 2025, I think it was a period which did not serve them well, and it did not serve us well.

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