Postcard from a Zero Covid world, a new Land Border Law, and the significance of Peng Shuai's revelations
Welcome back to The India China Newsletter!
The newsletter is back after a two month hiatus. Thanks and gratitude to readers for bearing with me during this absence. It was encouraging that lots of people wrote in to ask when the newsletter will resume. Normal service has resumed, and I'll try and keep up with my usual twice-a-week schedule of Tuesdays and Fridays (except on weeks where I’m swamped, only on Fridays!).
In this issue, which will be slightly longer than usual:
- A postcard from a Zero Covid world
- China's new border law and what it tells us about where India-China relations are heading
- Extraordinary revelations from tennis star Peng Shuai about former Politburo Standing Committee member Zhang Gaoli and why they are so significant
First, an update. I've spent the last two months finishing up a second book - more details on that soon - and preparing for a move back to China. I made it to Hong Kong after a terribly long journey (and just about made it given how difficult it is to travel here with flight bans and cancellations and the impossibility of finding a quarantine hotel with a three-month waitlist for limited rooms) and I am now 15 days through the mandatory 21 day hotel quarantine. (It’s a strict hotel quarantine - no stepping out of the room, unless you want a six month prison term and a 25,000 Hong Kong Dollar fine. Cameras right outside the door so don’t even think about it.)
One of the reasons I started this newsletter on January 1, 2021 was, in addition to tracking the India-China front, to go beyond the news and try and give a flavour of what it's like to live in and report from China. As readers know, I haven’t been able to do that really as I've been in India since early 2020. I still don't have a visa to return to Beijing. But Hong Kong, I suppose, is as close as it gets! I have very fond memories of Hong Kong from the few months I spent here in 2019 as a visiting fellow at Hong Kong University. That was, safe to say, a very different Hong Kong in the midst of the protests — pre-Covid and perhaps more significantly, pre-National Security Law, which has transformed this city.
It's been quite surreal travelling back to ‘Zero Covid’ China from India -- where we have been enjoying normalcy the last few months and “living with the virus” with low numbers of daily cases (a phrase much maligned in China), thanks to probably a combination, at least in the big cities, of decent vaccination rates coupled with, as sero surveys suggest, pretty much everyone already getting it. I'll write in more detail in coming days about Hong Kong's extraordinary measures still in place to keep the Zero Covid strategy going -- there have been no local cases for many months barring one involving an airport worker - and I had a taste of these measures on arrival, where passengers are tested, wait for the results, and if negative, are taken on designated buses to designated hotels for quarantine. Arrivals go through this perfectly maintained close loop to keep the local population insulated.
With Singapore, Australia and New Zealand all giving up on Zero COVID, it's pretty much only the Chinese mainland, Hong Kong and Taiwan that are still following this taxing approach and not opening up to the world. The excessive 21 days quarantine is part of it -- I've already been tested on Days 1, 3, 5 and 9, and tests follow on 16, and 19 (and I’m double vaccinated).
Hong Kong finds itself in a bit of a bind -- a kind of perfect metaphor for its broader economic dilemmas and for its identity as well -- where it wants to still hold on to its legacy as a global financial centre (“Asia’s World City”) but is increasingly bound to the fate of the mainland. Hong Kong has had to choose -- opening like Singapore to the world will mean no chance of opening with the mainland (mainland-HK travel is still restricted). The city's leadership has made clear the mainland will be the priority, so things are likely to get even stricter in Hong Kong. The papers today reported that a bubble with Guangdong may take off next month, which is good for those wanting to go to the mainland but bad news for those hoping for an opening up to the world, because keeping the bubble going will be contingent on Hong Kong's strict approach to allowing visitors from overseas.
We had a stark example of the stringency of the measures in the mainland last week when two trains en route to Beijing were stopped and passengers sent to quarantine after an attendant was found through contract tracing to have been a close contact of a positive case. In the past week, 5 friends of mine have been put in quarantine in Beijing (first time it's happened to anyone I know since the pandemic began) for not even being close contacts, but for being contacts of close contacts.
From conversations with people, it seems to me that most people in China have supported these measures over the past year -- the benefits have been leading largely normal lives in most places in China, having their kids go to school through most of last year unlike for us in much of the rest world, and no lockdowns for much of the second half of 2020 and the first half of 2021.
Now is the real test amid this current outbreak that’s spread to 16 provinces. Signs are patience is wearing thin -- those friends of mine who were very supportive of China's approach now feel its gone out of control and it’s excessive. (Another friend of mine went to visit a friend in a suburb near the Great Wall for lunch, and on his drive back from Beijing was barred from entering the city because had been to another province in the past 14 days. He had to take a Covid test to come back, so a two hour lunch ended up being a 72 hour affair.)
We should note part of the reason why people are very supportive of these measures is they are fed on a daily diet of how messed up the rest of the world is. My friends were shocked to hear from me how normal things in India now are, while they imagine our ICUs are still full and people are in panic, and were quite flabbergasted to do a WeChat video call with me the other day and see a playground in Chennai full of kids and (masked) parents all looking quite relaxed. This news diet folks are fed also complicates any further opening for China as people there now have come to strongly hold on to the view that Zero Covid is the only way, getting Covid is a death sentence and something to be terrified about, while those of us outside of the Zero Covid bubble clearly have a different view of.
It will be interesting to see how long China continues with this -- I'd bet at least until the 20th Party Congress in October 2022 -- and how long people will continue to be broadly supportive of this approach. From my unscientific sample surveys, i.e., convos with friends, patience wears thin real fast when it's you making the sacrifice needed that Zero COVID requires. When it's others who have been bearing that sacrifice for the past year -- like the hundreds of thousands of Chinese abroad who have been banned by their own country from going back and have not seen ill parents, or in some cases, even their kids, for two years, the Chinese media of course NEVER talks about them -- it's all well and good. Until that sacrifice is asked of you.
I won't make a judgement here on which approach makes sense for which country and I’m no public health expert. The Chinese argument is they have had normalcy over the past year that none of us have had, their kids haven’t missed school, and most importantly, they haven't lost loved ones as most of us have (I think everyone I know in India lost someone in our horrifying second wave). But a final thought I'd leave you with that I've been struck by is how much the Party and its media seem to believe this approach is praised by the world and viewed with envy, while in my view, I think most of their measures wouldn't be received well abroad and would be impossible to implement, and unlike folks in China think, no one really thinks this is a model to be emulated, regardless of all the costs we have paid. I also don't think you'd have that degree of compliance anywhere else in the world (not that people in China have a choice in the matter, but it's also striking that people seem to have so far gone along with it, as is the case with my friends, who say 'oh well, it is what it is.') I suppose at the end of the day it's a question of perspective and values.
On the same topic, an interesting read from the South China Morning Post on the opening up versus Zero Covid dilemma:
Chen attributes an outbreak this summer – China’s largest since the initial outbreak in Wuhan – to these factors, with initial cases being linked to airport staff in the eastern city of Nanjing. Staff there were thought to have been exposed to the virus while cleaning the cabin of a flight from Moscow, which carried an infected passenger. International flights and foreign travellers to China were already limited, but the authorities have tightened controls since that outbreak, which spread to 38 cities and about 1,000 people...
HKU’s Jin said that although measures surrounding travellers and airports may reduce cases, they come at a cost. “After Nanjing, they have heightened many of these [requirements], with a high price for the workers. They have made it more and more stringent, and it remains to be seen whether this really works,” he said, adding that there were question marks over the sources of some recent outbreaks – indicating a need for more testing to show cases were not being missed elsewhere.
But Kwok Kin-on, an assistant professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong’s JC School of Public Health and Primary Care, said that the more that loopholes at the border could be plugged, the less cost and staffing would be needed for lockdowns, case findings and contract tracing. “We can’t guarantee that the existing system is perfect, 100 per cent stopping the import of cases,” he said. “Even 0.1 per cent getting through is enough to result in an outbreak in the community.”
Despite the challenges, experts agree that at least in the next few months before Beijing hosts the Winter Olympics, there are unlikely to be any sweeping changes in disease control policy. China’s health officials have remained non-committal in recent public comments, with CDC director Gao Fu this month describing the country’s stance as “wait and see”, even with vaccination rates poised to exceed 80 per cent.
But vaccine protection and its role in blocking viral spread is part of the zero-Covid discussion, according to Kwok, given that recent studies have shown significant waning of antibody levels six months after inoculation with a widely used vaccine by China’s Sinovac Biotech. “If we insist on a zero-Covid policy, we must think about the waning of [vaccine] antibodies and the impact of the Delta variant or potential new variants on causing breakthrough infections,” Kwok said. “Because they were very successful in containing the virus, there is no domestic data to show, if they open up, what is the transmission rate and the fatality rate?” he said. “Even if China wants to open up, they do not have the data to open up.” “Even if a tiny proportion [of China’s 1.4 billion population] are hospitalised, it may crash the health care system,” he said.
The city in China worst affected by lockdowns -- and a city that has gotten little attention abroad and even within China until recently -- was Ruili near the Myanmar border. The situation was so bad after months of lockdown thanks to cross-border cases that a former deputy mayor spoke out, which is of course quite an unprecedented thing for him to have done (SCMP, paywall):
A former deputy mayor of Ruili has appealed for help and more resources for the remote Chinese city bordering Myanmar, which has been hit hard by the pandemic. Dai Rongli made the plea in an emotive essay posted to his WeChat account on Thursday. Titled “Ruili needs the motherland’s love and care”, it described the southwestern city as a place of broad banyan trees and home to ethnic minorities, and mentioned its history as an aircraft manufacturing base in the second Sino-Japanese war.
But the coronavirus had “mercilessly robbed this city time and again, squeezing dry the city’s last sign of life”, wrote Dai, who was deputy mayor for a year as part of a cadre training scheme and returned to Beijing in 2019. He said the people of Ruili had lost hope and income after enduring multiple lockdowns, with officials sacked each time, and it now lacked finances and workers. Dai’s unusually candid comments have been widely circulated online, drawing more than 100,000 views on his personal WeChat page. That has prompted Ruili officials to defend their pandemic controls, and for Dai to say he was just sharing his observations as a citizen. Residents can only leave Ruili after spending seven to 21 days in quarantine, part of it in a hotel, depending on the risk level of where they live in the city.
China on October 23 passed a new land border law. I will look at the law and explain why it's very significant as far as India is concerned, not just with immediate ramifications for the border, but for the wider relationship.
Xinhua reported:
China's top legislature on Saturday voted to adopt a new law on the protection and exploitation of the country's land border areas, which will take effect on Jan. 1, 2022.
Lawmakers approved the law at the closing meeting of a legislative session of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.
The law stipulates that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the People's Republic of China are sacred and inviolable.
The state shall take measures to safeguard territorial integrity and land boundaries and guard against and combat any act that undermines territorial sovereignty and land boundaries, it says.
The law also stipulates that the state shall take measures to strengthen border defense, support economic and social development as well as opening-up in border areas, improve public services and infrastructure in such areas, encourage and support people's life and work there, and promote coordination between border defense and social, economic development in border areas.
The state shall, following the principle of equality, mutual trust, and friendly consultation, handle land border related-affairs with neighboring countries through negotiations to properly resolve disputes and longstanding border issues.
For those who can read Chinese, here is a full text of the law.
To save others the trouble, here are a few of its articles that caught my eye (usual disclaimer with translations: done with the help of software for reasons of time and cleaned up by me here and there, it's faithful to the original but please don't use this as a literal translation):
Table of Contents
Chapter I General Provisions
Chapter II Delineation and survey of the land state border
Chapter III Land Boundary and Border Defense
Chapter IV Management of Land Borders and Boundaries
Section I General Provisions
Section II Land Boundary Management
Section III Border Management
Chapter V International Cooperation in Land Boundary Matters
Chapter VI Legal Liability
Chapter VII By-laws
Chapter 1
Article 1 In order to regulate and strengthen the work of land state borders, to ensure the security and stability of land state borders, to promote good neighborliness and exchange and cooperation between China and its land neighbors, and to safeguard national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity, this Law is enacted in accordance with the Constitution.
Article 4 The sovereignty and territorial integrity of the People's Republic of China is sacrosanct. The State will take effective measures to resolutely safeguard territorial sovereignty, prevent and combat any acts that undermine territorial sovereignty and damage the land state border.
Article 6 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for foreign affairs related to land borders, participates in land border management-related work, leads foreign negotiations, contracting, compliance and international cooperation, deals with issues that need to be resolved through diplomatic channels, and organizes the maintenance and management of national boundaries and boundary markers.
The Public Security department of the State Council is responsible for public security work in border areas, guiding and supervising border public security organs to strengthen social security management and prevent and combat illegal and criminal activities at the border.
General Administration of Customs is responsible for border crossings and other entry and exit-related supervision and management work, implementation of inbound and outbound means of transport, goods, goods and personnel customs supervision and quarantine.
State immigration management department is responsible for immigration management in border areas, the organization and implementation of entry and exit border inspection, border crossing management and border management in border areas according to law.
Article 7 Under the leadership of the Central Military Commission, the relevant military organs will organize, guide and coordinate the land state border and border defense and control, maintenance of social stability, the handling of emergencies, border defense cooperation and related work.
The Chinese People's Liberation Army, the Chinese People's Armed Police Force in accordance with their respective division of tasks, guard the land state border, to resist armed aggression, major emergencies and terrorist activities on the border, in conjunction with or to assist the relevant local departments to prevent, stop and combat illegal border crossing, to safeguard the security and stability of land state borders.
Article 11 The State will strengthen land borders education, cast a firm sense of community of the Chinese nation, promote the spirit of the Chinese nation to defend the unity and territorial integrity of the motherland, enhance the national concept of citizens and awareness of homeland security, the construction of a common spiritual home of the Chinese nation.
People's governments at all levels and relevant educational and scientific research institutions should strengthen the collection, protection and research of land borders and border-related historical materials.
Article 14 The People's Republic of China abides by the treaties concluded with foreign countries and jointly participates in matters relating to land borders.
Chapter III Land State Boundary and the defense of the border
Article 22 The Chinese People's Liberation Army and the Chinese People's Armed Police Force shall carry out border duty, control, organize drills and surveys and other activities at the border, resolutely prevent, stop and combat invasion, encroachment, infiltration, provocation and other acts, guard the land state border, and maintain border security and stability.
Article 23 The people's governments at all levels of the border provinces and autonomous regions to coordinate the allocation of resources, strengthen the construction of the group defense team to maintain the security of the national border, support and cooperate with the border guard duty, control work.
People's governments at all levels of the border provinces and autonomous regions to build infrastructure, should take into account the needs of land national borders and border defense. Citizens and organizations should support the border guard duty, control activities, to provide them with convenient conditions or other assistance.
Section II Land State Boundary Management
Article 32 The boundary markers and border security infrastructure are protected by law.
No organization or individual shall move or destroy the boundary markers and border security infrastructure without authorization.
If the boundary markers are moved, damaged or lost, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall organize restoration, repair or reconstruction after consultation with the relevant departments of land neighbors.
Article 34 The relevant departments of the State Council and the people's governments at all levels of the border provinces and autonomous regions shall take measures to maintain the stability of the boundary river (river, lake) towards, and in accordance with the relevant treaties to protect and rational use of border waters.
Article 40 Any organization or individual shall not build a permanent structure near the land boundary without the approval of the relevant competent authorities.
Section III Border Management
Article 43 The State supports the construction of towns along the border, improve the system of towns along the border, improve the function of border towns, and strengthen the construction of support capabilities.
Article 47 of the following circumstances, the state can seal the border control, close the port, and take other emergency measures in accordance with relevant laws and regulations.
(A) the surrounding war or armed conflict may affect the stability of national border security.
(B) the occurrence of a major incident that poses a serious threat to national security or the safety of personal property of border residents.
(C) the border is seriously threatened by natural disasters, accidents and disasters, public health events or nuclear, chemical or biological contamination.
(D) other serious impact on land borders and border security and stability of the situation.
Chapter V International Cooperation on Land Boundary Matters
Article 48 The State carries out international cooperation with land neighbors in accordance with the principle of equality and mutual benefit to deal with land border affairs, promote security cooperation, and deepen mutual benefit and win-win situation.
Article 49 The State may consult with relevant land neighbors to establish a joint border committee mechanism to guide and coordinate relevant international cooperation, implement relevant treaties, negotiate and deal with important matters related to the management of land borders.
Article 50 The relevant military organs may establish border cooperation mechanisms with the relevant departments of land neighbors, communicate and consult on major matters and issues in border interactions and cooperation, establish border talks and meetings with the relevant border agencies of land neighbors, negotiate and deal with border-related matters, consolidate and develop good neighborly relations, and jointly maintain the security and stability of land borders.
Article 51 The State may negotiate with the land neighbors concerned in the corresponding sections of the national boundary to establish a border (border defense) representative mechanism, consisting of representatives, deputy representatives and relevant staff, through talks, meetings and joint investigations to deal with border incidents, daily disputes and other issues. The specific work of the border (border) representatives under the guidance of the relevant departments of the State Council and the relevant departments of the Central Military Commission organs, the Chinese People's Liberation Army in conjunction with foreign affairs, public security, immigration and other relevant departments to organize and implement.
Article 62 This Law shall come into force on January 1, 2022.
COMMENT: Note that the border law was first suggested in March 2021, around 11 months into the LAC stand-off. Also note only India and Bhutan have unresolved land borders with China. Of course this isn't country specific and applies to all land borders, but I see several points of significance as far as India and the LAC are concerned. For one, in my view it formalises all of the PLA's actions along the LAC that violated past (four) bilateral agreements -- such as massive forward deployments, unilaterally attempting to redraw the LAC, etc -- as "legal" actions mandated by Chinese laws. While the law talks about honouring past bilateral agreements (a point also made by the Foreign Ministry when asked about it), it will clearly probably supersede those. The reference to promoting constructions along the border (Article 43) is also significant, coming as it does in the midst of the on-going effort to settle civilians in border areas, including disputed ones.
I would also note one broader point -- to me, the border law is one of many things that very clearly tells us where China sees the relationship with India going. Not that we needed another reminder of that after the PLA"s actions, but the border is now front and centre. That’s the message. No matter the Chinese Foreign Ministry saying it has "an appropriate place" in the relationship, I think the military's actions, and this law, suggest otherwise, and that China's actions in border areas are likely to continue and be stepped up.
India reacted sharply to the border law. Some may have suggested it didn't merit a response but as I said above, I think it's a significant development and required a response. This is what the MEA said. I thought the reference to the China Pakistan border agreement was particularly interesting as I can't recall India recently mentioning it publicly although it's well known India regards it as an invalid agreement:
China’s unilateral decision to bring about a legislation which can have implication on our existing bilateral arrangements on border management as well as on the boundary question is of concern to us. Such unilateral move will have no bearing on the arrangements that both sides have already reached earlier, whether it is on the Boundary Question or for maintaining peace and tranquillity along the LAC in India-China Border areas. We also expect that China will avoid undertaking action under the pretext of this law which could unilaterally alter the situation in the India-China border areas.
Furthermore, the passage of this new law does not in our view confer any legitimacy to the so-called China Pakistan "Boundary Agreement” of 1963 which Government of India has consistently maintained is an illegal and invalid agreement.”
On a related note, while the Western Sector and Ladakh have been the focus of the recent dispute with India, there is a worrying build-up in the Eastern Sector as well and across Arunachal. My colleague Dinakar Peri travelled there and I recommend reading his dispatch in The Hindu (paywall):
While India has strengthened its defences as well as added offensive elements to its military posture in the Tawang sector of Arunachal Pradesh, the massive Chinese infrastructure development and troop build-up in the Rest of Arunachal Pradesh (RALP) area is a matter of concern and efforts are on by the Indian side to address it, according to several officers.
There has been an increase in Chinese patrols in the RALP, especially in Asaphila area, along with massive development of infrastructure, at least two officers independently said. “They come for patrols and make a mess of the area. They leave stuff behind; in some instances, they had left tents and spades,” one of the officers with the knowledge of the matter said. “They have built extensive road construction all across,” the other officer noted.
Other than the Kameng area, which consists of the East and West Kameng districts, the rest of the State is referred to by the Army as RALP.
Shuxian Luo at Brookings has an analysis about the border law that I recommend reading in full, and highlights one important point:
The law notably emphasizes the role of Chinese citizens and civilian institutions in supporting the PLA and PAP — a likely manifestation of the “civil-military fusion strategy” in land border defense. A comparison of an earlier draft of the law and the final text is revealing in this regard. The draft released in August includes only one sentence requiring citizens and civilian organizations to assist the PLA and PAP. In the final text, this sentence is expanded into a separate clause. The newly added clause requires local governments in border areas to allocate resources to strengthen the building of “mass defense groups” (群防队伍建设) to support border defense missions. The concept of “mass defense” for borders, according to writings by Chinese security analysts, means to draw on local residents to assist with missions including information collection, order maintenance, and sovereignty and territorial defense.
On China and Bhutan, who recently agreed a border MoU, recommend this read from Manoj Joshi on the significance of the MoU and the way forward for their border talks:
In South Asia, China sees Bhutan, where it does not yet have an embassy, as the last frontier. Having made inroads into Indian pre-eminence in Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, Beijing would like to challenge New Delhi’s special relationship with Bhutan as well. Recent events, including Doklam and the revival of its claim in the eastern region, can be seen as systematic Chinese pressure to push the Bhutanese to comply with its demands.
So far, Thimphu has successfully walked the tightrope between its two giant neighbours, even while making it clear that it would not like to play New Delhi off against Beijing.
But recent developments suggest a perception in Bhutan that there are limits to which it can depend on India for its security.
With New Delhi itself hard-pressed along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), it is unlikely to be of much help to Bhutan. On the other hand, a settled border could have many benefits, including Chinese investments and tourists.
And finally...
Huge revelations this week from Chinese tennis star Peng Shuai, a household name here (second in tennis fame only to Li Na), a former World Number One in Doubles, winner of two Grand Slams in doubles. Eva Dou writes in the Washington Post:
A rare #MeToo allegation against a retired top Chinese official has sent shock waves through China, with censors scrambling to delete even vague online references.
A screenshot is circulating of what appeared to be a post late Tuesday on Chinese tennis star Peng Shuai’s verified Weibo microblog, alleging that former vice premier Zhang Gaoli had sexually assaulted her before she agreed to begin a years-long affair with him.
A public sexual assault allegation against a senior Chinese official is virtually unheard of in a country where officials guard their personal lives closely….
As Eva notes, earlier cases “were notable in that censors allowed widespread discussion of them online” and “state media weighed in with criticism of the accused men, and both incidents were among the top-read topics on Chinese social media.”
Not this time:
That was not the case for Peng. Her post has been met with a massive online blackout, a sign that Beijing’s new openness to #MeToo scrutiny doesn’t extend to top officials.
“We are all very nervous about what will happen to her,” said Lu Pin, a U.S.-based Chinese feminist campaigner who worked in China until 2015, when the government detained five of her colleagues. “At the same time, we feel this is something very important that has happened.”
No Chinese news outlets in China’s mainland were covering Peng’s allegations on Wednesday, and searches about the incident on Chinese social media platforms brought up no hits. Still, Internet users were commenting in coded terms, sometimes using words that sounded similar to Peng’s and Zhang’s names.
Lu Pin, a feminist and activist mentioned in the article, reflected on the significance of Peng’s allegations in this post:
Though only the tip of the iceberg, it exposes the real life of Chinese highest cadres, on how their power masked their hypocrisy, and how they are excessively corrupted. Peng’s disclosure was soon deleted and censored in China. But the censorship only helps to reveal the fear of Chinese top leaders, a fear that would have only been imagined but now put on the stage through silencing the voice in seconds in the witness of many. Why people find Peng’s story so real?
Because everyone knows that it must be true. In fact, the cadres have always been so rotten and degenerate; they have always exploited women but hidden in the dark. Peng’s disclosure is part of the #MeToo movement in China, and also more than that. I can’t praise #MeToo more! Its momentum has garnered attentions, raised consciousness, and driven actions for change in the past three years. Its impact is unprecedented. But the impact does not solely relate to the power position of those being accused: it is NOT a Chinese version of David-vs.-Goliath with many digital-savvy Davids confronting a handful mighty Goliaths.
What stands at the core of this battle is the courage of the victims/survivors who speak up and powerfully shake up many others in the society. Their disclosures have created ripple effect, inspiring more and more victims/survivors to stand up and speak up compellingly. #MeToo challenges what used to be considered as “normal,” especially on what can be said and what experiences and relationships are acceptable.
Do read her full post here.
That’s it for this issue. Thank you as always for reading, and see you next week. For readers in India and those celebrating around the world, wish you a very happy Deepavali weekend, and lots of light in the year ahead.