Shivshankar Menon and Ashok Kantha on the Border Agreement and the Future of the India-China Relationship
In this issue of The India China Newsletter, I am sharing the thoughts of Shivshankar Menon and Ashok Kantha on the recent October 21 border agreement between India and China, and on the state of the broader India-China relationship following the Modi Xi meeting.
Menon and Kantha were on an hour-long and very timely discussion programme this week hosted by Kapil Sibal, which you can watch here . I thought it would be useful in this issue to transcribe and organize their comments on particular issues of significance, which I thought would also be of interest to readers as well as a useful reference, on issues including:
- The recent border agreement
- Context on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) as a concept and how it has worked
- The possibilities of a larger boundary settlement beyond the recent disengagement agreement
- On forging a political consensus and national position in India on relations with China
- On the economic relationship
I think they both present very valuable perspectives and this is worth your time. Menon is a former ambassador to China, Foreign Secretary and NSA. He was Special Representative on the boundary talks. Kantha is also a former ambassador to China, and spent years in the Ministry of External Affairs dealing with China, including on the boundary question.
This post is around 3,500 words long. You may wish to click the headline and read in your browser. Please excuse typos.
On whether status quo has been restored after the October 21 agreement, and on the prospects for settling the boundary dispute:
Shivshankar Menon: The Army Chief is careful in what he says. He says we hope to restore the status quo. So this is an agreement so far that we know only for joint patrolling or coordinated patrolling in two areas in Depsang and Demchok. We have no idea where, we have no idea whether it's all on our side of the line, or where the Chinese are going. Are we legitimizing their Chinese presence on our side of the line which they respected before? We have no idea so I think we need to be a little careful before we over-interpret this.
This is maybe a way of politically opening the door to a dialogue but then we need to use that dialogue for something. I think we need to be reasonable in today's situation in terms of what we're looking at, if you can stabilize the situation good, but to look for a settlement of the boundary which has eluded us for 70 years.....
We know the problem well enough. I mean frankly, during the Special Representatives talks we had set ourselves a three-stage process. First, we said we'd do general principles, which we did in 2005, we signed an agreement when Wen Jiabao came to India.
Then we would do a framework for a settlement and then finally reduce the framework to a line on the map and demarcated on the ground, and have a boundary. We have done most of the framework. We know exactly where the problems are.
Today it's a question of a political decision on both sides saying let's do this, but whether either side is willing to take the political pain, because there has to be give and take -- it can't be only one sided, and how do you sell that politically? I'm not sure that governments today on either side are ready.
Ashok Kantha: There are different issues here. One issue is trying to sort out the mess that was created in the aftermath of Chinese transgressions in Eastern Ladakh in the summer of 2020. That this was very different from earlier standoff situations we need to take cognizance of - situations like he [Menon] was involved in, working out a standoff in Depsang in 2013 when essentially we could persuade the Chinese side to go back and restore status quo ante.
I was involved with the disengagement in Demchok and Chumar in 2014, and the brief given to me by was very simple - restore status quo ante as of 1 September 2014. I just didn't discuss anything at all. I kept repeating this and they agreed, and actually we had an agreement in in writing.
This time what happened was they had amassed fairly large body of troops opposite Ladakh. We apparently misread their strategic intention. We thought it was a routine military exercise and because of Covid we didn't have the mirror exercise on our side which we normally do, and they pivoted and they transgressed into multiple areas on our side of the LAC….
Between June 2020 and September 2022, we could work out the engagement in Galwan Valley, Gogra Hot Spring area and Pangong Lake Area. But with a serious caveat from our side. They involved buffer zones. That means our troops could not go to patrolling points they were visiting earlier, graziers could not go to pastures they were using earlier, and they were largely on our side of the LAC. It was meant to be we thought a temporary expedient, but this is not being reopened now. The Foreign Secretary has clarified that under the latest understanding it has not been reopened. As Mr. Menon mentioned, what was announced on 21st October is limited to two pockets, only in the Depsang plains and Demchok.
The facts are not fully known. Hopefully we'll be allowed to go up to the five patrolling points beyond what we call all Y-Junction, Bottleneck, and in the Demchok area, we will be able to go up to the Charding-Nilung Nullah junction, which we traditionally did. But this will be part of coordinated patrolling, so it is a new sort of concept we have introduced. How deep the Chinese will come, what will be restrictions in patrolling, all that is not known.
The first thing which is required is that there must be greater transparency, greater visibility about what has been agreed. Number two, what was agreed upon in other pockets, Galwan Valley, Gogra Hot Spring, Pangong Lake, that is not the final solution because that involves basically loss of territory for us, and as long as that arrangement stands, there's no restoration of status quo ante.
As Mr Menon mentioned, if you look at the Army Chief’s public lecture on 22nd October, he's very clear that you require restoration of trust, then we'll have process of disengagement, deescalation and deinduction, so it's going to be a complicated process.
Once disengagement is carried out, you have to pull back troops, which is again going to be a difficult proposition. My point is you can't refer to normalcy being restored in border areas until disengagement has been carried out to our satisfaction which involves restoration of status quo ante, and until the state of militarisation of the border has been resolved. So it's a long way off. Only after that we can start talking about relations returning to the normal track. I think [External Affairs Minister] Dr. Jaishankar is very clear that the state of borders will determine the state of relations. As long as borders are abnormal, we cannot have normalcy in relations. Going by that, it's going to take time.
On the Line of Actual Control as a concept and how it has worked:
Menon: About the LAC, there is no agreed Line of Actual Control that both sides have drawn on a map, that both said this is the line. But in most places we know the limits that we patrol, and the limits that they patrol. We know where we go and there are about 16 areas where we clearly have different perceptions where we both go, or where we think he's coming across on our side and where he thinks we're going across. Those areas have been fairly clearly identified, so the armies know on both sides and the governments know on both sides which the areas are. But if you say where's the actual precise line, there's no such thing as an agreed or delineated border.
In fact in some ways that works for us. You have the capacity to embarrass the Chinese just as they can embarrass you. After all, why are you saying that ‘nobody came’ because you don't want to be embarrassed politically. You can embarrass him also. This is a very long border. In 2010, we raised two additional mountain divisions, in 2013 we raised the whole mountain strike corps because we saw this coming. We saw what was happening on the Chinese side. I'm not such a pessimist that ‘oh the balance is terrible that we can't handle this’. We know how to handle it. It takes some determination will take some time.
About the status quo, when we say status quo, we mean status quo before they moved forward and that's why we've always said status quo as of April because the movements we assume were in May. I notice there is ambiguity, people start saying status quo ante, but ante what? The Chinese never say status quo. They're the ones who moved forward. They're very happy where they are, so they say no, let's establish peace as we are, we'll do deinduction, we'll do de-escalation, build buffer zones... it's all happening on your side so they're quite happy to do this. And over time if you keep doing this, it amounts to real salami slicing, little bit by bit by bit…
That's the risk here when you a) don't have a defined LAC and b) if you're vague about what you mean by status quo and which status quo, and if you don't show the will or the capacity to actually enforce your own claims.
Kantha: On this point about status quo, the Army Chief has been very categorical more than once speaking in public functions. I referred to his remarks on 27 October when he stated clearly we want the status quo to be restored as of April 2020 because this is when Chinese amass troops and they made these multiple transitions across the LAC.
As far as the LAC is concerned, Mr. Menon is absolutely right. Both sides have a very clear understanding of where the LAC lies and the pockets where we have overlapping patrolling. Overlapping patrolling as gone on for a long time. That's why if you look at when we were negotiating CBM [confidence-building measures] protocols of 2005 we have a separate provision on what happens when patrols come face to face. We agreed on detailed modalities on how they disengage and go back to their respective bases.
The problem is that they would like to make a creeping acquisition inch by inch. They are doing it and this is a part of a larger policy China is pursuing, what is sometimes referred to as grey zone warfare. They're doing this in the South China Sea very successfully. They're doing in the East China Sea in the Senkaku/Diaoyu area and they’re doing it in the Taiwan Strait. And they are doing it along India China borders where they keep changing facts on the ground incrementally, but staying [under] the threshold of outright military conflict.
It becomes difficult to deal with them. The point he made, when it comes to detering China it's not that we can't do that. It is not a question of their defense budget being four times larger than us. It basically boils down to what kind of forces you can muster and bring to bear upon the LAC and in certain areas we have the advantage. For instance, you know the fact that our airfields are at lower altitudes so there are advantages.
When we assess what happened on October 21, apparently up to 5 am in the morning they were negotiating. One area where if indeed we have been allowed to go back to five patrolling points beyond Bottleneck, that's a significant gain because the Chinese wanted to block us there as it also provides a sort of ingress route towards Aksai Chin, the G219 is there, they building another highway parallel to that, so they wanted to retain that advantage. If there is overlapping or coordinated patrolling, to some extent that advantage they had gained is negated.
The other thing it's very important which we need to know is if there is a quid pro pro. If they agreed to allow us to resume patrolling up to our traditional patrolling points in Depsang and Demchok – there are media reports suggesting that they have been allowed patrolling in Yangtse and Asaphila area [in Arunachal in the Eastern sector]. Yangtse is one area where we are militarily well entrenched. According to reports available in the public domain, in December 2022 a fairly large body of PLA troops came and they were foiled. But if those concessions were made, I think that is a serious concession.
On the boundary problem and where ties are headed:
Shivshankar Menon: I wish I had the silver bullet, a magic solution. I think the problem is not a technical problem. Everyone now knows the lie of the land, knows which bits are important. The question is the political will to settle it - whether there is or isn't the political will on either side to tell your own people, look, you have to change the way you learn to draw the map of your own country in school. That's a big political ask for any politician. You have to be able to show some concomitant gain at least, and neither side has come to that [conclusion] simultaneously so far.
There have been times when we've been ready, and when they've been ready. If you look at the history of the past 70 years, you've had a series of missed opportunities when one side or the other was willing to settle. Zhou Enlai said, we'll be realistic where you are holding and you accept what we are holding. Nehru then told him, look opinion in India – after 1959, after the Dalai Lama and Tibetan refugees had come to India, after China which had kept quiet on the boundary and said we have no territorial dispute suddenly in January 1959 in Zhou's letter said ‘we have these huge claims and the whole boundary is disputed’…. So everyone in India felt betrayed. So Nehru actually sent him to each of the ministers to explain to him that look, this is my cabinet, I can't get this through. Zhou thought if this had happened in Peking, it would have been a setup. He thought when each Minister gave him a lecture that he was being insulted. So from that point on that opportunity went.
But you had other opportunities. Mrs Gandhi was very keen actually in the 60s. And again, three days after signing the treaty with the Soviet Union in 1971 she writes a note to P.N. Haksar saying shouldn't we offer the same thing to the Chinese, which shows how pragmatic she was in the way she looked at these things.
So for me, it's a history of missed opportunities but ultimately it's political will on both sides and at what stage will both sides feel [a settlement is worthwhile]. We came close in Rajiv Gandhi's time because our economies were the same size, we were at similar levels of integration with the world economy, even in terms of technology there wasn't much to choose between us. Today the balance of power is very different between us. So you can see the way the Chinese behave is very different again and they feel the balance is in their favour.
You saw what they did in Galwan in the Western Sector. Frankly, if you ask me is a settlement imminent I wouldn't think so, but you need to find some way of living with China as a fact of life.
On India’s trade deficit with China and economic ties:
Menon: In the 5 years before 2020 there was about $21 billion worth of Chinese investment into India and there was some hope of reducing the deficit if Chinese manufactured in India, we started exporting out, and we built some manufacturing here to balance it out. After 2020 of course, we stopped investments. Now you've gotten to work yourself into a position where it's very hard to see how you can deal with that deficit because China is critical to your economy in many crucial sectors, automobile parts, APIs for Pharma, electronics. In fact something like almost close to 40% of your manufactured imports originally come from China.
So you have yourself into a position where actually you have the same problem as the Americans, you are structurally economically linked to China and you will do damage to both of yourselves if you try and decouple. So you can derisk but you can't decouple.
But you have huge issues on the political side. As he said, the Foreign Minister says rightly you can't have a normal relationship if the border situation is not normalized and so we have this dilemma. To that extent what happened this October if it opens the door to a proper political dialogue, because ultimately these are not the kinds of issues that either soldiers or diplomats or bureaucrats can settle. The politicians need to decide how they want to handle it.
I'm not saying solve it because politics is a process, things evolve, they can mutate into benign or malign forms, and you can manage the issues. And in our case with China we have such big, fundamental issues -- that I think it's more a question of coming to some political understanding.
That's what we did. Rajiv Gandhi's visit [in 1988] gave you 25 years of peace to go your own way, each of you. The Chinese made better use of those 25 years maybe, but you did better than anyone else in the world except the Chinese. Now you need to find a new modus vendi somehow. Whether you can or not, I don’t know. I'm not betting on it today.
It's not your GDP that deals with their GDP. Ultimately, as he said it is how much power you can bring to bear on the actual problem. The border problem is not a question of their GDP being five times bigger than you or your population is bigger than theirs. These are frankly irrelevant. China fought the Korean War when you look at the state of their economy and they fought the Americans to a standstill in Korea.
Kantha: On economic engagement, it's a fairly complex picture. On the trade account, if you look at international trade centre data last year trade deficit was $106 billion. Our total exports were $16 billion which was a decline from $23 billion in 2021, and it’s not likely to pick up momentum. We have all struggled with trying to remove non-tariff barriers without much success, so trade will remain highly asymmetric to our disadvantage which is not viable.
More importantly we have developed dependencies on China in areas which is most unhealthy and it affects economic security. In fact, already, just to give you two examples. We buy tunnel boring machines from China. We have made some headway in terms of tunneling in border areas. They have stopped selling those machines. Another area where they have a monopoly – in green energy we want to develop our own ecosystem. We have done relatively well when it comes to solar panels and solar modules. But we want to move to ingots and wafers. 95% of machinery for fabricating that is with China and they've stopped selling to us. Getting into this kind of situation is not advisable at all. 85% of our API requirement comes from China – for a country that styles itself as the pharmacy of the world.
On forging a political consensus in India:
Menon: When we were negotiating the Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement [signed in 1993] with China, Narasimha Rao [then PM] told me in 1992 you go and meet the following six people every month and talk to them about the agreement. He mentioned Vajpayee, Advani, Gujral, he had a list of people - all of them outside his cabinet and Opposition leaders.
So I told him what do I tell them? I don't have even have a draft agreement, we only have an agreement with the Chinese that we'll talk. He said go and ask them what to do. So I went and asked them what should we do…. We went through this every month. I'd go for six months.
I'll say this for them. They spoke for the country. Each of them. They never said how does my party do out of this. They weren’t party political I remember Vajpayee distinctly said if you think it's good for the country, do it. For me that was great learning because they were part of the process. Of course I couldn't tell them all the details of the negotiation and so on and Narasimha Rao also told me don't tell them everything! But at the end of it we had a national consensus behind what we were doing.
Kantha: I was Director at that time. The 1993 and 1996 CBMs I was asked to negotiate. Once we had negotiated the package – Salman Haider was Foreign Secretary and asked me to go to the CPM headquarters. I was asked to go and brief Opposition leaders before we had signed the agreement in confidence. No one broke that confidence .
The same thing happened in 2005 after we had negotiated the agreement on political parameters and guiding principles for a boundary settlement. A very sensitive agreement. I was told go and be brief Mr Advani . He was leader of Opposition . I briefed him and he heard me out.
No one opposed either of the two agreements because they were seen to be in the furtherance of national interest. So we need to ensure that some of these issues go beyond partisan politics. This is very important. Otherwise we can't deal with a country like China.
Before the difficulties we had over Eastern Ladakh, the Wangdung Incident [in Sumdorong Chu valley in 1986] was the last time when India-China borders became live… Almost from day one we maintained complete transparency. The MEA spokesperson briefed media that there has been transgressions by China and they have occupied this post in Wangdung in Sumdorong Chu valley.
On the whole, actually maintaining that kind of visibility, sharing information with other political parties and the public, in fact it helps negotiators. So there are of course details of negotiating positions you can't make public, that goes without saying, but a general stance of greater visibility about the outcomes as also the problems, is most helpful.
Thank you for reading.