Welcome to today's The India China Newsletter.
This lengthy issue will focus on today's announcements from China on disengagement on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), why there are reasons to be cautious, and what lies ahead.
On the eve of the 7-day national holiday in China that starts tomorrow on lunar new year's eve, the PLA and Foreign Ministry issued two separate statements on the LAC situation.
This was the statement from PLA Senior Colonel and Defence Ministry spokesperson Wu Qian:
The Chinese and Indian frontline troops at the southern and northern bank of the Pangong Tso Lake start synchronized and organized disengagement from February 10, said Senior Colonel Wu Qian, spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of National Defense, in a written statement on Wednesday.
This move is in accordance with the consensus reached by both sides at the 9th round of China-India Corps Commander Level Meeting, the statement said.
This was followed by a statement by the Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin:
According to the consensus reached at the Chinese and Indian Foreign Ministers' meeting in Moscow and the ninth round of commander-level talks between the two sides, the front-line troops of the Chinese and Indian militaries began to conduct simultaneous and planned disengagement in the Pangong Lake area on February 10. We hope the Indian side will work with China to meet each other halfway, strictly implement the consensus reached between the two sides and ensure the smooth implementation of the disengagement process.
Comment: On the face of it, the two announcements could potentially signal the beginning of the end of months of tensions on the LAC. As of late Wednesday evening, India was yet to make any formal statement on the disengagement process that is underway. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh is expected to make a statement in Parliament tomorrow. But there are many reasons to be cautious. For one, what the two statements didn't say is that what has begun, in the view of Indian sources, is only a partial withdrawal, limited to armoured elements and not a withdrawal of all frontline troops who remain where they were for the most part.
My colleague Dinakar Peri and I report for The Hindu:
This is the first phase of disengagement with some tanks and armoured elements on the South bank being withdrawn as well as thinning down of troops on the north bank, a Government of India source said. However, troops continue to remain in key positions.
It would be a multi-step process for disengagement and de-escalation along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and would take time, said a second government source.
You can read the full report here.
My colleague Vijaita Singh also reports in The Hindu:
China and India have agreed to return to the pre-April 2020 positions in Eastern Ladakh along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), according to the latest disengagement plan being implemented on the ground, The Hindu has learned.
A senior official said the agreement effectively means that China will vacate the Finger area on the north bank of Pangong Tso (lake) and India will have to climb down from the advantageous position it has taken on the southern side of the lake.
Comment: My sense is this is a (welcome) initial step but by no means marks the end of tensions. It's not even the beginning of the end but the beginning. India will insist on returning to the pre-April 2020 status quo, which would also mean China dismantling a lot of infrastructure it’s put in some of those areas. Also worth keeping in mind it's not the first disengagement plan and previous plans didn't always work out on the ground (in fact, the June 15 clash in Galwan Valley unfolded over a disagreement on a de-escalation process that's underway).
Of course, a withdrawal of armoured elements who were, as Snehesh Philip reports, in extremely close proximity, is a good development in of itself:
There was no official word from India yet on this development, but sources in the defence and security establishment said both countries have started to withdraw their armoured elements from the southern banks of the Pangong Tso.
They said withdrawal is happening from the northern bank of the lake too, and that disengagement is not limited to just the Pangong Tso. However, it remains unclear where else the disengagement taking place.
The countries had placed their tanks on the southern bank following the operation carried out by specialised elements of the Indian forces on the night of 29-30 August last year. The tanks had been placed “dangerously” close to each other — just a few feet away — according to sources.
Asked if Indian soldiers are being pulled back from the Kailash ranges near Pangong Tso, the sources said they remain in place as of now.
The Hindustan Times adds:
India and China have started pulling back armoured elements - tanks and infantry combat vehicles - from heights on the southern bank of Pangong Tso, people familiar with the disengagement plan in New Delhi said.
Troops are still holding positions on these strategic heights, they said on the condition of anonymity after the Chinese defence ministry announced in Beijing that the troops had started to disengage along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) near the salt-water lake.
The reports of withdrawal of the armoured elements from one of the many friction points in the East Ladakh sector comes nearly a fortnight after military commanders of the two armies agreed on January 24 to push for an early disengagement of their frontline troops.
In an article today written before the announcement but still worth reading, former Northern Army Commander Lt Gen Hooda (retd) offered a cautionary message:
We must assess the likely Chinese actions that could confront us as the summer comes around. The Ladakh border has solidified with thousands of soldiers facing each other, and there are little prospects of further PLA intrusions in this area. China is also unlikely to initiate a war that it has no guarantee of winning.
The real danger in the coming months lies in the PLA moving selectively across the LAC, particularly into other disputed areas in the Central and Eastern sectors. This would be a part of their ‘salami tactics’ that remain below the threshold of triggering a large-scale conflict. The Indian approach must be to deter the PLA from such actions.
He called for a “strategy of deterrence has three main components, known commonly as the 3 Cs – Capability, Communication, and Credibility” and wrote on the third of those, “which is perhaps the hardest to achieve”:
It is primarily a commitment to clearly stated redlines and a demonstrated resolve to carry it through. Capability and communication are of little use if there if the opponent perceives a lack of resolve by the defender in making good his threats.
Over the next few months, India’s military moves must be tailored towards sending out a strong message of its willingness to use force if the PLA attempts to further transgress across the LAC. This would imply a strengthening of its military posture to respond to PLA actions and an acceptance to raise the stakes, if required.
All this is not to suggest that there is only a punitive component to deterrence. Thomas C Schelling, who pioneered the study of conflict behaviour in his classic The Strategy of Conflict, has described conflict situations as “essentially bargaining situations” in which, apart from differences between the two sides, there is also “a powerful common interest in reaching an outcome that is not enormously destructive”. This common interest also serves as a deterrent to risky behaviour.
It would be the best scenario if India and China can find common interest in peacefully resolving the current standoff at the LAC. However, for this to happen, China, as the aggressor, must be made to realise that any further provocation could result in high costs. India’s communications must be clear and actions credible.
Another cautionary note today (also written before the announcement) by Maj Gen Asthana (retd):
The Chinese future strategic aim in 2021 is likely to be to hold on to its gains, and get Indian troops out of Kailash Range. The approach of talks to reach an agreement for disengagement and de-escalation based on mutual and equal security, are aimed to make Indians pull back from Kailash range in exchange of PLA pulling back slightly from some unimportant areas.
A military action post winters to evict Indian Army from Kailash Range by China cannot be ruled out, but the option is marred with a major risk of loss of face for Xi Jinping, as a military defeat is the last thing which he would like to face, that too in centenary of formulation of CCP. PLA’s centre of gravity of military operations will continue to be East Ladakh and actions along rest of LAC will be to increase the cost of stand-off for India, and strengthen its bargaining position.
The Indian aim should be to not concede unilateral shift of LAC as LAC-2020, be prepared for ‘Two Front War’ as a worst case scenario, and continue capacity building accordingly. The talks should continue, but by any strategic calculations, I do not see China conceding to Indian official demand of pulling back to pre-April 2020 positions through talks.
With such operational compulsions, commencement of some tactical probing actions, and resultant patrol clashes are likely, as we improve infrastructure in 2021. In light of no major breakthrough till the 22nd round of China-India border talks, I do not expect any worthwhile development on delineation, delimitation and demarcation of LAC. As long as the LAC is not demarcated, a temporary solution will only postpone the next standoff and may lead to LOCisation of LAC.
The Chinese will like to keep border unsettled till the time the political cost of not settling it, becomes higher than doing so, for CCP, China.
Shi Jiangtao at the South China Morning Post writes today on the border issue:
There is a curious recurring cycle of tension and detente in the complicated relations between China and India regarding their Himalayan border. The cycle has occurred several times since 1962’s border war, especially during confrontations in 1987 and 2017, when tensions risked spiralling into a military conflict. They both preceded turning points and bore similarities to the current Ladakh stand-off, which is entering its ninth month.
The 1987 stare-down in Arunachal Pradesh’s Tawang district, which China claims as part of Tibet, was the biggest military face-off since 1962. The world’s two most populous nations almost went to war over a row about infrastructure building after diplomatic and military talks failed to calm matters. It wasn’t until the top leaders intervened, after nearly a year, that both sides agreed to step back. It then took years to complete disengagement and restore the status quo in the mid-1990s....
Strategically it is tempting for China to try to use the border dispute to bog down India and undermine its global potential, and Beijing is confident it has an edge militarily and economically. But with Beijing and Washington at loggerheads, the last thing China needs is an armed conflict with India that might force India’s hand on firming up a security alliance with the US. Besides, with the 4,000km-plus border largely unmarked, and mutual distrust so high, there is little chance of either side making territorial concessions.
Instead of focusing on their almost insolvable border dispute, the priority for both should be to prevent the resulting tensions spiralling in an age of rapidly spiking nationalism, which calls for intervention from the top. With both nations turning increasingly inward and authoritarian, no one is in a better position to act than the nationalist leaders Xi and Modi.
The Biden administration weighed in on the border. State Department spokesperson Ned Price had this to say:
We are concerned by Beijing's pattern of ongoing attempts to intimidate its neighbours. As always, we'll stand with friends, we'll stand with partners, we'll stand with allies to advance our shared prosperity, security and values, in this case, the Indo-Pacific.
Speaking on the India-China talks on the border standoff, Price said that the US supports peaceful resolution of the situation.
"We are closely monitoring the situation. We know the ongoing talks between governments of India and China and we continue to support direct dialogue and a peaceful resolution of those border disputes," he said.
Global Times editor Hu Xijin released a video on the Biden-Modi phone call and the reference to shared democratic values:
The US wants to encourage India to engage in more conflicts with China.... Advocating the development of US-India relations based on common democratic values is hypocritical and empty. If India does not handle its relationship with China properly, it will be useless to develop any kind of alliances.
You can watch the full video, which is in English, here.
And finally…
Tomorrow marks the start of China’s most important holiday. It’s a very different new year in China, as CNN reports, a time that is usually one for joyous reunion:
Normally at this time of year, hundreds of millions of Chinese people would be packing highways, trains and planes on homebound trips to celebrate the Lunar New Year with their family. But this year, the largest annual human migration on Earth has been put on hold, following the Chinese government's call to avoid "nonessential" trips during the holiday period to prevent a resurgence of the coronavirus.
That is a lot to ask. The Lunar New Year, also known as Spring Festival in China, is the most important holiday in the Chinese calendar -- the equivalent of Thanksgiving, Christmas and New Year's Eve combined. For many Chinese who left their hometowns for better job opportunities in big cities, it is the only chance they may get to see their families this year. Parents who left children behind in villages so they could work may face another 12 months without them.
To discourage people from traveling, China's National Health Commission has imposed new rules that require people returning to rural areas to produce a negative Covid-19 test taken within the previous 7 days, and to spend 14 days in "home observation" upon arrival.
Some local governments have added their own, stricter rules. For example, in some places, returnees need to spend two weeks in a government-approved quarantine hotel, instead of remaining under observation at home with their families.
The new restrictions have provoked fury on social media, with some questioning the government's policy at a time when many people had hoped to go home.
"I would like to ask, did you seriously think about it and look into it before making this policy?" one person posted on Weibo, China's Twitter-like service. "Do medical conditions in the vast rural areas allow everyone to have an coronavirus test every 7 days? Doesn't the gathering for coronavirus tests bring a bigger risk of infection? In addition, the state only gives us 7 days of statutory holiday, and now you ask returnees to be isolated for 14 days. What are your brains made of?"
For months, state media has celebrated China's success in taming the coronavirus, contrasting its speedy, effective measures with the chaotic approach of some Western governments. But this year has brought fresh challenges. In January, more than 2,000 positive cases were detected in China's northern provinces, the worst resurgence of the virus since March. Given the virus' rapid transmission, Beijing recognizes the need to move quickly, as do the Chinese people, but that doesn't mean they're happy about it.
It's the second year in a row that the Lunar New Year, which begins on February 12 this year, has been overshadowed by the coronavirus pandemic that has claimed more than two million lives worldwide.
To lift spirits, Li Ziqi, who I wrote about in Monday’s newsletter, has released a new video today that captures the festive mood that usually marks this week:
Tomorrow is the eve of the lunar new year, and Friday, February 12, Friday, marks the start of the Year of the Ox. If you are an Ox like I am - this Zodiac calculator will tell you what your sign is if you aren’t sure - the year of your Zodiac is believed to be a particularly significant one (and a dramatic one, in a good way or bad). The last time it was an Ox year, 12 years ago, I moved to China for the first time. Perhaps my second innings there, which has been delayed by a year already, will begin in an Ox year too (maybe it’s fate!). Wishing all readers wherever you may be a happy and healthy Year of the Ox — and good riddance to the Year of the Rat.
Since China will be mostly shut down for the next seven days and it is usually a slow time for news, this newsletter will take a break on Thursday and Friday, and will be back on Monday.
Thank you for reading!
Thank you so much Ananth, for starting this newsletter. Wish you and all readers a very happy Niu year.