How India and China arrived at a deal to disengage at the LAC, and debating the terms of disengagement
Welcome to today's The India China Newsletter.
In this issue, I’m looking at:
- The disengagement process that’s now underway along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), and how the Chinese media is framing a PLA withdrawal from occupied territory.
- How the deal was agreed, the debate about terms of disengagement, and did India squander leverage? My view is it is perhaps the best possible deal under the circumstances and the leverage argument is being overstated.
- What this may mean for the relationship going forward, including for trade and investment ties that have been hit by the stand-off.
The disengagement agreement, which Defence Minister Rajnath Singh announced in Parliament on Thursday - and discussed in the previous issue of this newsletter - is now in progress. Here is a striking image shared today by the Indian Army, showing a de-induction of PLA soldiers on the south bank of Pangong Lake:
If you, like me, are wondering how China’s media will explain the PLA’s withdrawal from territory it’s been sitting on for months — especially between Finger 4 and 8 on the north bank of Pangong Lake - the Global Times has helped answer that question, and also offered a cautionary note, that I’ve marked in bold, that is worth paying attention to:
Indian media reported that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had withdrawn more than 200 main battle tanks from Pangong Tso and used more than 100 heavy vehicles to ferry the troops by Thursday.
Chinese experts said the massive withdrawal shows Beijing’s sincerity for peace and border stability, at the same time showcasing the country’s increasingly growing defense capability. In other words, the PLA has the ability to withdraw this many forces in one day, but also can replenish that much in a single day, the experts noted.
Chinese experts said the number of tanks and heavy vehicles reported by Indian media may not be that accurate, but the withdrawal reflected Beijing is sincere in resuming peace and stability along the borders….
The speedy withdrawal of the tanks and other heavy weaponry also showcased the remarkably improved defense capability of the PLA, following years of in-depth military reforms orchestrated by Beijing, they said.
In other words, the PLA can withdraw this many armaments and ground forces in one day, but it also can replenish that much very quickly.
Snehesh Philip and Nayanima Basu at The Print have a great account of how the agreement was reached:
Over the course of the stand-off, India and China have conducted multiple rounds of talks at the military and diplomatic levels, but the stalemate, sources said, was finally tackled during the Corps Commander dialogue last month.
The stalemate was caused as India and China struggled to see eye-to-eye on how exactly to move forward with resolving the stand-off.
In September, China asked India to withdraw from certain crucial heights on the southern banks of the Pangong Tso — heights Indian soldiers occupied in an operation on the intervening night of 29-30 August that took the People’s Liberation Army by surprise.
India, meanwhile, insisted on disengagement at all friction points in Ladakh. However, the Chinese were not open to withdrawing from Finger 4, which they had captured in May 2020.
As the Chinese realised that India was not budging, sources said, China modified its proposal in October and brought in a plan for phased withdrawal. They said the PLA would withdraw from Finger 4 to Finger 5 and called for making Finger 4 a no-go area. This proposal, too, was rejected by India as it wanted the PLA to move behind Finger 8.
With the icy-cold Ladakh winter bringing temperatures as low as minus 20 degrees Celsius in November, China agreed to go behind Finger 8, sources said.
According to the proposal agreed to by both sides, the Chinese were to move back beyond Finger 8 and also remove all tents and observation posts set up in an 8-km area. Similarly, Indian troops were to move back to the Dhan Singh Thapa post, which is between Finger 2 and Finger 3.
After this broader agreement, the talks again went into a stalemate, and the next round of Corps Commander dialogue was not held until 24 January.
In the interim, India and China withdrew over 10,000 troops each from depth areas as part of a joint understanding while keeping soldiers untouched in forward locations.
The row at the two other points — Gogra-Hot Springs and Depsang Plains — will take time to resolve, sources added.
Nitin Gokhale at StratNews Global has more details on the terms of disengagement:
Multiple stakeholders involved in the negotiations reveal the constant battle of nerves that was fought across the table during nine rounds of negotiations with the Chinese, initially by the 14 Corps Commander and his team and in later months in association with the joint secretary handling China in the Ministry of External Affairs.
The result: A rare written document about the disengagement process detailing sequential steps, distance and place to which heavy armour and weapons platforms would be withdrawn in phases, also how and when negotiations over the remaining friction points in Ladakh would take place.
“Patience is the key in negotiating with the Chinese. We realised this early. So despite tremendous pressure from critics and detractors to get an agreement at the earliest, we never succumbed,” revealed a key participant in the process. For instance, in the seventh round the Chinese proposed a formula whereby they would withdraw to their post at Sirijap (east of Finger 8) but wanted to patrol up to Finger 5 at least once a month, while confining India to Finger 3. India refused the bait. “We kept chipping away at their proposals and putting forth counter-demands. We said we will not vacate the heights on the south bank of Pangong Tso until they agreed to pull back completely to Sirijap,” the official said.
Eventually in the eighth and ninth rounds, the Chinese conceded but wanted an immediate disengagement of armour at the Chushul heights in return. Looking at China’s softening stand, India pressed harder and asked for creation of a no-patrolling zone in the area between Finger 3 and Finger 8 until military and diplomatic discussions were held to find a permanent solution.
The terms have, this past weekend, been debated hotly in India. Congress leader Rahul Gandhi had this to say:
The Indian government’s position at the beginning of this (Ladakh standoff with China) was status quo ante starting April 2020, which is what they had been negotiating for. Now, the defence minister comes and makes a statement that Indian troops are going to be stationed at Finger 3,” Gandhi told a media briefing on Friday.
“Why has Indian territory been given to the Chinese? This is the question that the Prime Minister and defence minister need to answer,” Gandhi said. The Congress leader also asked why the Chinese army hadn’t withdrawn from the Depsang Plains and Gogra-Hot Springs border.
This was a fairly typical example of the criticism:
The criticism can be summed up as two-fold: one, India is giving up access to its LAC by accepting the buffer zone; two, India is giving up leverage just to settle one dispute while others are unresolved.
Nitin Gokhale, in his piece, explains why India saw the deal as acceptable:
For India, this was acceptable for two reasons: One, this would mean the Chinese had to vacate the area they were occupying between Finger 3 and 8 since May 2020. This was the restoration of status quo ante pre-May 2020 on the north bank of Pangong Tso that India wanted. The creation of a no-patrol zone was temporarily acceptable to India since India foot patrols used to go up to Finger 8 around once in two months (because of lack of road from Finger 3 to Finger 5 on the Indian side) while the Chinese could come up to Finger 5 swiftly and frequently since they had managed to build a road from Finger 8 in the 2000s (after starting to lay a track in 1999).
On the south bank, India had indeed taken the Chinese by surprise on August 29-30 by outracing them to the heights in the Chushul sub-sector. First Indian infantry climbed the peaks at Gurung Hill, Magar Hill, Mukhpari, Rezang La and Rechin La and then Indian armour was deployed at those heights before China could react. Subsequently, the Chinese also managed to get their main battle tanks (T-96s) on the reverse slopes of these peaks. This unprecedented face-to-face deployment of tanks (barely 100 feet apart) was like sitting on a tinder box. Militarily, it was not a situation that could be sustained indefinitely by either side. So Indian interlocutors, seizing the opportunity, used the south bank deployment as a leverage to get what it wanted on the north bank as part of a practical solution….
The Chinese sent back a written document on February 9, signed it on the morning of February 10 and started to withdraw heavy armour from the peaks in Chushul immediately. By the evening of February 11, over 200 Chinese tanks were back to Rutog military base, some 90-100 km from Moldo. “It appeared as if the Chinese were in a hurry to complete the disengagement quickly, perhaps because the Chinese New Year begins today (February 12),” sources said. India, meanwhile, pulled back its tanks to Loma, a small hamlet near Nyoma.
From Rajat Pandit’s report in the Times of India, who said disengagement may be completed in Pangong lake by the end of this week (so in a 10-day period, which is quicker than the three weeks that was initially expected):
Within 48 hours of completing the Pangong Tso disengagement, India and China will hold the 10th round of Corps Commander level talks to focus on the Depsang plains as well as continuing friction points like Gogra and Hot Springs.
The report quotes an official saying there are less soldiers there, but Depsang 'will be quite tricky':
Some in the defence establishment feel India should have used the bargaining leverage provided by occupation of the Kailash Range heights for negotiations on the Depsang imbroglio, instead of squandering it just for the Pangong Disengagement pact. But the government says Depsang is an old, lingering problem that has to be tackled separately.
COMMENT: As I said in the previous issue, it’s my view that this is a reasonable agreement under the circumstances.
On India giving up patrolling rights up to its LAC on the north bank, so is China. To my eyes, on the north bank, it can be argued China is giving up more — it dominated up to Finger 4 and is also dismantling infrastructure, which India doesn’t have there to anywhere near the same degree. Also in my view, it isn’t accurate to say the buffer zone is entirely on India’s side of the LAC. China, I understand, claims up to Finger 2. India claims up to 8. It is the most reasonable agreement to have both at their permanent bases as a temporary measure. Also, just a few months ago, some of those critical of the agreement were saying Finger 4-8 is a lost cause forever and China would never withdrew. Demanding a return to the exact status quo - of both jostling between 4 and 8 - is illogical. Expecting China alone to withdraw and India to have a free run is not what the status quo was.
The second criticism on leverage is an interesting question and one that’s a matter of opinion. Of course, ideally, India would want China to completely vacate all areas, including Depsang. But two seasoned observers I spoke to said it was an unrealistic expectation, as one put it, “made by those who have never been in a negotiating room”. Adding Depsang to the mix, which in their view was a problem going back “ a decade at least” and not related to the current crisis, would be like “going into a store with just one coupon and demanding they give you all the products on their shelves.” Also, the expectation very much is under the plan China will withdraw from Gogra-Hot Springs points of contention so if they do follow the plan as agreed, it’s not exactly the case that the leverage was used only for one spot and it would cover the friction areas post April 2020. In any case, this is a bit of a hypothetical/subjective debate, and I don’t expect it to end anytime soon.
Also, I should flag again, as I have been flagging as there is perhaps no more important element to all of this: everything depends on China following the written agreement, which is the biggest uncertainty surrounding all of this and could render all debates irrelevant if that doesn’t end up being the case.
For more on the LAC if you haven’t had enough:
Has the disengagement plan hurt or help India’s security interests? I had a 27 minute conversation with the knowledgeable Sushant Singh, if you’d like to listen to it, for The Hindu In Focus podcast (subscribe to our podcasts on iTunes or Spotify!).
An interesting report in the Deccan Herald says: “The government hopes to completely resolve the military stand-off between India and China within the next two or three months in order to create a conducive atmosphere for Prime Minister Narendra Modi to host Chinese President Xi Jinping for the BRICS Summit.”
COMMENT: The BRICS Summit in 2017 in China played a role in pushing a quick end to the stand-off in Doklam. On that instance, Modi was being hosted by Xi. Who said BRICS was completely useless and a waste of time…
Even if the disengagement goes according to plan, comments from India’s Army Chief are a reminder there is no going back for the two militaries (and, in my view, for the relationship):
A day after New Delhi confirmed the start of the disengagement process at Pangong Tso as a first step to resolve the nine-month military standoff in Ladakh, Army chief General MM Naravane cautioned against Beijing’s recent moves, including along the Line of Actual Control, which “have created an environment of confrontation and mutual distrust”.
Addressing the joint annual seminar of the Assam Rifles and United Services Institution — excerpts of the keynote address Friday were made available to the press — General Naravane said: “The rising footprints of China in India’s neighbourhood and its attempts to unilaterally alter the status-quo along our disputed borders have created an environment of confrontation and mutual distrust.”
This will probably apply for the trade and investment relationship too.
This report says India is considering relaxing some of the restrictions on China, which is possible, but I think some others are likely to stay and the events of 2020 will continue casting a shadow on how Chinese investment is viewed, especially in the tech sector and telecom, which are probably hold the biggest value for China Inc:
India may ease some restrictions for Chinese investment in the country without compromising national interest or hurting local enterprise, as the border tension that flared up in 2020 has started improving, sources said.
The matter has been discussed at the level of the cabinet secretary and ministries of finance, home, and commerce and industry, they said.
Restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI) by Chinese companies may be reviewed, sources said. In April 2020, India tightened the rules for FDI from countries with which it shares a land border.
And finally…
This weekend, I reported on how a PLA think-tank’s strategy document from eight years ago offers some clues on China’s border moves, which are still a mystery, and why stable land borders for India that would create the conditions for a growing maritime footprint were seen as a prospect that threatens China’s interests.
The entire document is fascinating, beyond the China-India dynamics, and is worth reading at your leisure.
Thank you for reading this issue!