Making sense of India's and China's plan for disengagement on the LAC - Five Takeaways
Making sense of India's and China's plan for disengagement on the LAC - Five Takeaways
Welcome to today's The India China Newsletter -- a bonus issue that I didn't plan to write having decided, as mentioned in yesterday's newsletter, to take a break until Monday over the usually quiet new year holiday in China which began today.
Since there is, however, an on-going major development to disengage on the Line of Actual Control, which this newsletter discussed yesterday, as well as lots of doubts and questions on what exactly India and China have agreed to -- Is this a big deal? Or another false start? Is there room to be cautiously optimistic? -- I thought I'd try and address some of those issues briefly and what exactly the plan seems to entail, at least from what I've been able to glean.
Some of those questions were answered by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh's detailed statement in Parliament today, which you can read here in full. I wanted to flag this portion:
I am happy to inform the House today that as a result of our well thought out approach and sustained talks with the Chinese side, we have now been able to reach an agreement on disengagement in the North and South Bank of the Pangong Lake. It has also been agreed to convene the next meeting of the Senior Commanders within 48 hours after the complete disengagement in the Pangong Lake area so as to address and resolve all other remaining issues.
The agreement that we have been able to reach with the Chinese side for disengagement in the Pangong lake area envisages that both sides will cease their forward deployments in a phased, coordinated and verified manner. The Chinese side will keep its troop presence in the North Bank area to east of Finger 8.Reciprocally, the Indian troops will be based at their permanent base at Dhan Singh Thapa Post near Finger 3. A similar action would be taken in the South Bank area by both sides. These are mutual and reciprocal steps and any structures that had been built by both sides since April 2020 in both North and South Bank area will be removed and the landforms will be restored. It has also been agreed to have a temporary moratorium on military activities by both sides in the North Bank, including patrolling to the traditional areas. Patrolling will be resumed only when both sides reach an agreement in diplomatic and military talks that would be held subsequently. The implementation of this agreement has started yesterday in the North and South Bank of the Pangong Lake. It will substantially restore the situation to that existing prior to commencement of the standoff last year.
I want to assure this House that in these talks we have not conceded anything. The House should also know that there are still some outstanding issues with regard to deployment and patrolling at some other points along the LAC in Eastern Ladakh. These will be the focus of further discussions with the Chinese side. We have agreed that both sides should achieve complete disengagement at the earliest and abide fully by the bilateral agreements and protocols. By now, the Chinese side is also fully aware of our resolve. It is therefore our expectation that the Chinese side will work with us in full sincerity to resolve these remaining issues.
My five point take-away:
1. Indian troops remaining at their base in Finger 3 and Chinese troops remaining east of Finger 8 at Sirijap, if implemented, sounds like an eminently reasonable agreement and compromise to me. The crisis on the north bank of Pangong Lake began last summer when India was unable to reach Finger 8 — the Fingers 1-8 run from west to east, as Rajnath Singh’s statement said, India’s post is near 3 and China’s is just east of 8. The disputed area is broadly between 4 and 8. In the past, Indian troops patrolled up to 8 — on foot, because there is no motorable road that goes from India’s post beyond the ridge at 4. China, however, has a road that runs all the way to 4, so essentially dominated the area from 4-8 and enjoyed logistical superiority. The crisis last summer began when Indian troops were stopped from reaching 8 on their normal patrolling route. Now, both sides have compromised by creating a no-man’s land. China will also dismantle any infrastructure it’s built post April 2020 in this area.
2. A similar compromise has been made south of the lake — India will vacate the strategically important heights it occupied in late August as a response to China’s moves. Both will return to their bases at Chushul and Moldo, and most importantly, tanks that were in extremely close proximity have already begun withdrawing. India is giving up some really important leverage it acquired by the countermove, and hopefully the deal holds and this area too remains a buffer (and there won’t any Chinese moves subsequently to move in and occupy those vacated heights — you can be sure that will be carefully monitored as it’s safe to say trust has been shot by now). Here’s a striking photo of the withdrawal made available today by the Indian Army:
3. Ultimately, the success of this plan hinges on if it’s implemented on the ground. But that is true with any plan. Assessing the plan in of itself, it has cracked the hardest nut in this recent LAC crisis, which was Pangong Lake. The buffer at Galwan Valley has largely held so far. After the full withdrawal has been done — which should take two to three weeks barring no hiccups (and that is still a lingering question, considering the June 15 clash in Galwan Valley happened during a de-escalation process — no one will want a repeat of that) - both sides will in the next 48 hours take up the next unresolved issue at Gogra-Hot Springs.
4. The belief is tackling the stand-off there at Patrolling Points 15 and 17A should be more straightforward considering there are nowhere near the same number of troops or the deployment of tanks and artillery that we saw at Pangong Lake. If the Pangong Lake consensus holds, this should be easy to settle. The other major significant remaining problem is in the Depsang plains, where Indian patrols have been stopped from reaching patrolling points there and China has fortified its position. From India’s point of view, there is somewhat less urgency to deal with this for two reasons — this problem predated the 2020 crisis, and there is no stand-off or eyeball to eyeball situation that warrants a different kind of alarm, as significant as this problem still is to be dealt with going forward.
5. Finally, the fact that both have agreed to disengage from Pangong Lake — which, let’s not forget, most observers (including this writer) felt a few months ago would be impossible given that China had so deeply entrenched its hold from Finger 4 to 8, an area it has now agreed to withdraw from — is being seen in Delhi, as Rajnath Singh the Defence Minister put it, as a result of making China “fully aware of our resolve”. If it’s not a return to the exact status quo ante — which saw a situation where both sides patrol in this area — it is a broad return to the ground situation in a sense, as both sides now won’t patrol in the area.
Delhi will see that as a win, and as a vindication of its two-pronged approach: signalling its ability to match China on the border by matching its deployments in heavy numbers and also through the countermoves in late August, and signalling that it is willing to take a leaf out of China’s playbook by escalating the crisis into, for instance, economic measures, such as an effective complete curb on Chinese investment, banning of apps, etc. Not that these moves hurt China’s wallet in any significant way, but they did send a message that certainly was heard, evinced at least in numerous official (and semi-official, via State media) Chinese statements that have focused perhaps even more on the economic matters than the boundary.
Praveen Swami has an interesting piece today on the deal I recommend reading in full:
The deal won’t be hard to monitor: satellites, drones with high-resolution cameras, and troops positioned on heights give both the PLA and Indian Army excellent visibility. Ahead of the spring, negotiators hope, the deal will deepen trust, and thus enable more troop withdrawal.
In some senses, the agreement restores the ground position before April 2020, when the PLA move to seize territories across the LAC. For years, the PLA’s patrols had moved out of Sririjap over Finger 8 and on to Finger 4; the Indian Army, in turn, patrolled the territory from Finger 4 to Finger 8. Neither side held positions in the area, though.
Even though critics will argue this week’s agreement concedes the PLA’s claims on the LAC, by suspending India’s right to patrol up to Finger 8, that argument obviously applies to China as well.
Generals in Indian Army’s Northern Command have long debated the merits of creating such demilitarised zones in contested parts of the LAC. Proponents argue these patrols serve no military purpose and raise the risks of fights breaking out between troops — an all too frequent occurrence.
He adds a word of caution:
To create this zone, moreover, India has used up an important bargaining chip, pulling back from the positions it took on the Kailash range.
There’s also the fact, secondly, that key areas of contention remain unresolved, in at least one case involving territory significantly larger than the Fingers. The PLA has cut off Indian patrols headed out through the Depsang plains to the arc marked by Patrol Points 10, 11, 11A, 12 and 13. At Bottleneck, a rock massif through which Indian patrols must pass to move through the plains, the PLA has created new, reinforced-concrete bunkers.
Finally, the PLA has mounted pressure elsewhere along the LAC, building roads and villages through disputed territory. Last month, the PLA sought to block Indian patrols at Naku La in Sikkim — part of a pattern of behaviour that could hold the kernels of future crisis.
These concerns aren’t reasons not to disengage troops; the deadlock at the LAC puts both countries at risk of ending up at war through missteps and miscalculations. New Delhi’s deal with China is a significant step away from the brink.
Former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran spoke to The Print:
So to that extent, the Indian response, which has been quite a substantial response in terms of the number of troops we have put on the field, in terms of capabilities that we have deployed, perhaps, China may not have expected that kind of a reaction,” said Saran.
“They thought it to be a low-risk kind of an operation but it has proved not to be such an operation. If you compare the Chinese rhetoric when Doklam happened in 2017 with the current impasse in Ladakh, the response seems to be much more muted,” he said.
In a tense situation like the Ladakh stand-off, India can seek help from countries like the US for defence hardware, sophisticated weaponry and intelligence sharing, he added.
Saran also defended India’s stringent economic actions against Beijing in response to the border issue such as restricting foreign direct investment and ban on Chinese apps, saying “China doesn’t not always gets it right”.
“China should realise that other aspects of the relationship will be affected. Their objective would have been that while they can do this, India would not find it in its interest to undermine the very dynamic economic and trade relationship with China… I don’t think China always gets it right,” he said.
This evening, I spoke to my two colleagues Dinakar Peri and Vijaita Singh, who provided some excellent context — and warning notes — about where we go from here, in this 17 minute Podcast that might be of interest.
And finally, a rather striking video of the disengagement developments:
Thank you for reading this issue! Have a good weekend, and the newsletter will be back on Monday.